Political Tensions in Mexico and Texas, 1836
Introduction
In the mid-1830s, Mexico was a young republic riven by a fundamental political divide: centralism versus federalism. This ideological conflict pitted those favoring a strong, centralized national government against proponents of a federal system granting significant autonomy to states and localities. Nowhere were the stakes of this clash higher than in the northern frontier region of Texas, then part of the Mexican state of Coahuila y Tejas. By 1836, longstanding tensions over governance, power, and rights had erupted into open war—the Texas Revolution. This article examines the origins and development of Mexico’s centralist and federalist factions, the dramatic reversal of President Antonio López de Santa Anna from federalist hero to centralist strongman, and how these conflicts shaped events in Texas. We explore the perspectives of diverse stakeholders in Texas, including the original Anglo-American settlers of the DeWitt Colony, the Tejano (Mexican Texan) leaders like Juan Seguín, and the waves of new immigrants from the United States—many of them illicit—who pushed for self-governance. Further, we situate the Texas crisis within the broader Mexican constitutional turmoil of the 1830s, including the dismantling of the Federal Constitution of 1824. Finally, we trace the key political, military, and cultural flashpoints leading up to the 1836 war, with special emphasis on the Battle of Gonzales and the Texas Declaration of Independence. Throughout, primary sources and scholarly analyses are employed to provide a comprehensive, nuanced understanding of the centralist vs. federalist tensions that defined Mexico and Texas in 1836.
Federalist and Centralist Factions in Mexico: Origins and Ideologies
The roots of Mexico’s centralist–federalist conflict lay in the aftermath of independence from Spain (achieved in 1821) and the struggle to define the new nation’s political order. In the early 1820s, Mexican politics coalesced into two broad ideological camps. Federalists (often associated with liberalism) advocated a republican constitution with significant states’ rights, modeling aspects of the United States system. They favored local control by elected citizens and limits on the power of the national government, believing this decentralization would best reflect Mexico’s regional diversity and the ideals of popular sovereignty emerging from the Enlightenment and Independence movements. Federalists were generally supported by liberals, intellectuals, provincial leaders, and others who distrusted the old centralized structures of Spanish colonial rule. In contrast, Centralists (often conservatives) argued for a unified, strong central government in Mexico City, contending that a young nation beset by internal and external threats needed tight coordination and authority from the top. Centralists tended to be aligned with the traditional elites of colonial New Spain: the military officer corps, the Catholic Church hierarchy, and large landowners. They looked back to the more centralized Spanish viceregal system and feared that excessive local autonomy could lead to instability or even fragmentation of the nation.
This ideological divide was evident immediately after independence. Mexico’s first post-independence government under Emperor Agustín de Iturbide (1822–1823) had been essentially centralist (even monarchical), but it was short-lived. A coalition of republican leaders, including a rising general named Antonio López de Santa Anna, overthrew Iturbide in 1823 and paved the way for a federal republic. In 1824, a new Federal Constitution of 1824 was enacted, establishing the First Mexican Republic as a federation of sovereign states. This constitution, much like that of the United States, divided power between a central government and the states, and it was explicitly welcomed by both Mexican liberals and the Anglo-American colonists in Texas. Under the 1824 charter, Texas was joined with the region of Coahuila as the state of Coahuila y Tejas, with its capital initially at Saltillo. Texans—both Tejanos and the newly arrived Anglo settlers—generally applauded the federal system, seeing in it a promise of local self-governance and protection of their rights within a Mexican constitutional framework.
Nevertheless, from the start, Mexico’s federal experiment was fraught with challenges. The young republic lacked strong democratic traditions, and the centralist–federalist fault line often overlapped with other social divides. Many conservative Centralists blamed the nation’s instability on federalism, arguing that empowering the states (and extending broad male suffrage) had weakened the country. Meanwhile, liberal Federalists saw the persistent push toward central authority as a reversion to colonial-era autocracy. Throughout the 1820s, Mexico’s presidency oscillated between these factions. Liberal presidents like Guadalupe Victoria and Vicente Guerrero embraced the 1824 federal constitution, whereas conservative backlashes—such as the revolt led by Vice-President Nicolás Bravo in 1827 and the coup by Anastasio Bustamante in 1829–1830—sought to recentralize power and halt liberal reforms. Bustamante’s regime (1830–1832) in particular was openly centralist and authoritarian, influenced by his advisor Lucas Alamán. It curtailed press freedoms, strengthened the military’s role, and, importantly for Texas, tried to reduce American influence by halting further U.S. immigration and enforcing customs laws in Texas.
Bustamante’s centralist policies provoked resistance across Mexico. Federalist liberals rallied around Antonio López de Santa Anna, who, despite being a caudillo with shifting loyalties, cast himself as the defender of the 1824 Constitution in this period. In 1832, Santa Anna led a successful revolt that ousted Bustamante and ostensibly restored liberal governance. For a brief moment, it appeared the federalist cause had triumphed: Congress reinstated the Constitution of 1824 and Santa Anna was hailed (including by Texans) as a savior of the republic’s federal principles. However, as we shall see, this triumph was short-lived. By the mid-1830s the conservative-centralist camp would reassert itself with Santa Anna ironically at its head, leading to a renewed political crisis that engulfed Mexico and its state of Texas.
Santa Anna’s Ideological Shift: From Federalist Champion to Centralist Strongman
Antonio López de Santa Anna exemplified the fluid politics of early 19th-century Mexico. A charismatic yet opportunistic military leader, Santa Anna’s political ideology was far from consistent – he “came to power as a liberal twice” but also presided over draconian conservative regimes. In the early 1830s Santa Anna enjoyed broad support among Mexican federalists and even among Anglo-Texan colonists. He had built his reputation by opposing authoritarian centralism: he helped topple Iturbide’s would-be monarchy in 1823 and later led the 1832 liberal revolt against Bustamante’s centralist government. Texan colonists, who resented Bustamante’s restrictive measures, publicly aligned themselves with Santa Anna during the 1832 disturbances. In the Turtle Bayou Resolutions of that year, Anglo-Texans declared their support for Santa Anna and the federalist cause against Bustamante. Stephen F. Austin and other Texan leaders at the time viewed Santa Anna as a potential ally who might address their grievances under the federal constitution.
However, Santa Anna’s commitment to federalism proved fleeting. By 1834 he dramatically reversed course. Pressured by conservative elements—the army high command and the Catholic clergy foremost among them—Santa Anna abandoned the liberals and embraced centralism, effectively betraying the Constitution of 1824 he had sworn to uphold. In May 1834, he aligned with reactionary forces under the Plan of Cuernavaca, which nullified the liberal reforms of Vice President Valentín Gómez Farías and dissolved the Congress. Santa Anna suspended the federal constitution, dismissed state governors and legislatures, and began concentrating power in Mexico City. By 1835 he had become the central figure in a Conservative Party regime determined to remake Mexico as a unitary state.
Santa Anna’s ideological volte-face can be partly explained by pragmatism and personal ambition. As a seasoned caudillo, he was adept at sensing the shifting winds of power. In 1833, after leading the liberal revolt, Santa Anna spent much of his time at his Veracruz hacienda, leaving governance to Gómez Farías. But when the liberal reforms (such as curbing military and church privileges) provoked a fierce conservative backlash, Santa Anna seized the chance to cast himself as the savior of order. By siding with the army and clergy, he gained their political backing. He “switched sides” and supported a successful coup against the liberal government in 1834, positioning himself as the unchallenged authority. This shift suggests that Santa Anna’s ultimate priority was consolidating his own power; federalism or centralism were means to that end depending on the context.
Santa Anna’s turn to centralism had direct and fateful consequences for Texas. Once in control, he moved to tighten Mexican authority over its far-flung territories, including Texas, where many Anglo settlers had grown accustomed to semi-autonomy. In 1835, Santa Anna’s government enacted the Siete Leyes (“Seven Laws”), a new constitution (formally promulgated in late 1835 and early 1836) that abolished the federal system and reorganized Mexico into a centralized republic. Under the Siete Leyes, the states (including Coahuila y Tejas) ceased to exist as semi-sovereign entities; they were converted into military districts or departments governed by officials appointed from Mexico City. The power that had been guaranteed to states under the federal system was stripped away and shifted to the national government. Santa Anna also insisted on rigid enforcement of Mexican laws in Texas—laws that many Anglo colonists had been lax in following. These included prohibitions on further U.S. immigration, customs duties enforcement, and the ban on slavery, which threatened the economic interests of slaveholding settlers.
Santa Anna’s new hardline stance led him to take a series of aggressive measures in Texas in 1835. Mexican authorities sought to disarm the Texan colonists and stamp out any hint of dissent. Local disturbances were met with force. For instance, in 1835 a small revolt in Anahuac and open defiance in other communities prompted Santa Anna to dispatch additional troops to Texas. Perhaps most telling was his reaction when peaceful petitions failed: after Texan emissary Stephen F. Austin traveled to Mexico City in 1833 seeking reforms (including separate statehood for Texas) and voiced support for local self-rule, Santa Anna’s government jailed Austin for over a year on suspicion of inciting insurrection. By late 1835, Santa Anna regarded Texas not as a province whose local concerns could be accommodated, but as a defiant region to be brought to heel by military might. When sporadic armed resistance broke out in Texas in autumn 1835, Santa Anna vowed to personally lead an army north to crush the rebellion and “punish the so-called ‘Texians’”.
It is worth noting that Santa Anna’s pivot to centralism shocked and disillusioned many who had supported him. Mexican federalists felt betrayed by his power grab, and several states rose in revolt (as detailed in the next section). Likewise, Anglo-Texans who had cheered Santa Anna in 1832 now vilified him in 1835. One Texan contemporary observed that Santa Anna had become “the Napoleon of the West,” accusing him of naked ambition and tyranny for casting aside the constitution he once championed. Santa Anna’s ideological shift thus became a catalyst for conflict, unifying disparate groups in Texas—Anglos and Tejanos alike—against what they perceived as his oppressive centralist regime.
The Mexican Constitutional Crisis of the 1830s and Texas
Santa Anna’s consolidation of power was part of a broader Mexican constitutional crisis in the 1830s that shook the foundations of the republic. This crisis was marked by the dismantling of the Constitution of 1824, the imposition of the new centralist order, and violent upheavals as multiple regions resisted these changes. Understanding this context is crucial to grasp why Texas ultimately erupted in rebellion and declared independence.
By 1835, the Mexican Congress (now dominated by conservatives) had moved to formally repeal the federalist constitution. In its place, they drafted the Constitution of 1835–36 (the Siete Leyes), a series of seven constitutional laws that fundamentally altered Mexico’s governance. Under these laws, the autonomy of the states was eliminated: governors would be centrally appointed, state legislatures were abolished, and even the name “state” was replaced by “department”. A new fourth power, the Supreme Conservative Power (Supremo Poder Conservador), was established to veto acts deemed threatening to the established order. The intent was clear – to prevent the kind of liberal local initiatives that had flourished under federalism. President Santa Anna’s decree of December 1835 implementing the Siete Leyes “stripped political autonomy from Mexican states”, reducing them to administrative units of the national government.
These drastic changes provoked outrage and resistance throughout Mexico. Several states in different corners of the country outright rejected the centralist decrees. Notably, the state of Zacatecas in the west and Coahuila y Tejas in the north refused to disband their state militias or accept dissolution of their legislatures. In May 1835, when Zacatecas defied an order to reduce its militia, Santa Anna marched his army there, crushing the Zacatecan rebels in a bloody battle. After capturing the city of Zacatecas, Santa Anna allowed his soldiers to sack the city; this punitive action shocked many and signaled the ruthlessness with which the central government would enforce its will. The governor of Coahuila y Tejas, Agustín Viesca, likewise protested Santa Anna’s orders. He and the state legislature at Monclova attempted to maintain Coahuila-Texas’s sovereignty—at one point even selling public lands to raise funds for resistance. Santa Anna responded by sending troops to dissolve the legislature and arrest Viesca (who fled and was briefly aided by Texan sympathizers like Juan Seguín, as discussed later).
Across the country, the pattern was “the military and clergy, and aristocrats” on one side versus “liberalists” on the other. As one contemporary Texan observer noted in early 1836: “throughout the republic, the two parties are arrayed… look at the liberal line, extended from Acapulco in the south to Texas in the east; and you find states and generals… reiterating the same principles with yourselves, to sustain the Constitution of 1824”. Indeed, revolts erupted in at least eight Mexican states from 1835 to 1836 in reaction to Santa Anna’s centralism. Even the far-southern state of Yucatán declared its independence from Mexico in early 1836 rather than submit to the new order (Yucatán would remain a largely autonomous republic for several years before rejoining Mexico). In the north, New Mexico and other territories showed discontent, and in Coahuila y Tejas the situation was reaching a breaking point.
For Texans specifically, the constitutional crisis had immediate practical consequences. Under the 1824 Constitution, Texas (as part of Coahuila y Tejas) had representation in a state legislature and some degree of local self-rule through ayuntamientos (municipal councils) and the state’s laws. Although Texas was paired with Coahuila (with a Hispanic-majority population) and often felt underrepresented—Texas had sought separate statehood in the conventions of 1832 and 1833—it still benefited from the federal structure. For instance, local militias were legal and commonly used for defense (notably against indigenous raids), and colonists expected the “constitutional liberty” guaranteed by the federal system, such as trial by jury and local judicial authority. The Mexican government had invited Anglos to settle Texas under the promise of these rights, as the Texas Declaration of Independence later reminded: “The Mexican government, by its colonization laws, invited and induced the Anglo-American population of Texas to colonize its wilderness under the pledged faith of a written constitution, that they should continue to enjoy that constitutional liberty and republican government to which they had been habituated in the land of their birth (the United States of America)”.
All of this was effectively nullified by Santa Anna’s centralist revolution. When the federal republican constitution “no longer had a substantial existence” and the government was forcibly changed into “a consolidated central military despotism”, as the Texas Declaration phrased it, Texans felt that the social contract under which they had settled the land was broken. The forms of federal governance disappeared – by late 1835, even the semblance of the 1824 constitution was gone, and officials loyal to Santa Anna took charge. Texans’ petitions and legal appeals for relief went nowhere; indeed, their envoys (like Austin) were “thrown into dungeons” instead of heard. Local elected authorities in Texas towns found themselves increasingly overridden by military commanders (such as Colonel Domingo de Ugartechea, the Mexican commander in Béxar/San Antonio) enforcing edicts from central authorities. The dissolution of the Coahuila y Tejas legislature in 1835 left Texas without any effective representation in Mexican governance at the very moment when laws most threatened Texan interests.
Texans initially responded to this constitutional crisis with a mix of alarm and hesitation. In the summer of 1835, before outright war began, communities in Texas debated how to respond to Santa Anna’s actions. Some conservative or recently arrived Mexican officials in Texas counseled obedience to the new laws, while many Anglo settlers and liberal Tejanos favored resistance. Public opinion was sharply divided: a number of local meetings were held to discuss the situation. According to historical accounts, some communities (including, ironically, Gonzales at first) declared their loyalty to Santa Anna’s centralist government in mid-1835, hoping to avoid conflict. Others were increasingly vocal in opposition. Eventually, by late summer 1835, even moderates agreed to convene a Consultation (convention) of Texas delegates in October 1835 to decide a course of action. This was a risky step—Mexican officials would see any unauthorized assembly as a prelude to rebellion—but the collapse of constitutional order compelled Texans to consider governing themselves.
In summary, the broader Mexican turmoil of the 1830s set the stage for the Texas Revolution. Santa Anna’s overthrow of the 1824 federal system was viewed by many Texan colonists (and by liberal Mexicans) as an illegal usurpation of power—“constitutionally null and void” in the words of one Texan in 1836. When the Mexican nation acquiesced to Santa Anna’s changes, Texans felt “cruelly disappointed” and even absolved of their previous loyalty. It created a scenario in which, as the Texas Declaration would later argue, “civil society [was] dissolved into its original elements,” freeing the people to “abolish such government and create another in its stead”. While this was the Texans’ justification, it was born from genuine grievances over the loss of local governance, the threat of military enforcement of unpopular laws, and the end of constitutional rule. The stage was thus set for confrontation as 1835 turned to 1836.
The Settlers of DeWitt’s Colony: Expectations and Reactions
One of the original Anglo-American settlements in Texas, DeWitt’s Colony, offers a revealing case study of Texan sentiment during the centralism vs. federalism conflict. Established in the 1820s under Green DeWitt’s empresario grant, DeWitt’s Colony centered on the town of Gonzales along the Guadalupe River. The roughly 400 families who settled under DeWitt were predominantly from the southern United States, drawn by promises of cheap land and political liberty under Mexican rule. Like other authorized colonists, DeWitt’s settlers agreed to become Mexican citizens and abide by Mexico’s federal constitution. Their early experience illustrates both the high hopes placed in the federal system and the growing friction as Mexico’s policies shifted in the 1830s.
The colonists’ expectations of Mexican governance were rooted in the liberal promises of 1824. They came believing that Texas would be lightly governed, with local affairs largely in the hands of the settlers themselves. Mexico’s federal colonization law and Coahuila y Tejas state laws extended generous terms: each family received a sizable land grant, and empresarios like DeWitt administered local settlement contracts. Crucially, settlers expected to “continue to enjoy constitutional liberty and republican government” comparable to what they had known in the United States. In practice, through the late 1820s, this expectation was largely met. DeWitt’s Colony formed its own municipal government in Gonzales with an alcalde (mayor) and ayuntamiento council chosen by the settlers. They managed local issues with minimal interference, as long as they formally upheld Mexican law (which included nominal conversion to Catholicism and allegiance to the federation). One analysis notes that DeWitt’s colonists remained relatively moderate in their views, generally sympathetic to the Mexican government during the 1820s and not at the forefront of early dissent. Unlike some other colonies, they saw little direct conflict with Mexican authorities in those years. The town of Gonzales even became a kind of buffer community, providing defense against Comanche raids with a Mexican-provided cannon and militia (the genesis of the famous Gonzales cannon).
However, as the Mexican political climate turned more centralist, the DeWitt colonists grew uneasy. They had upheld their end of the colonization bargain and expected Mexico to uphold its constitutional guarantees in return. Centralist policies felt like a betrayal. Several specific issues stirred discontent in DeWitt’s Colony:
Restrictions on Immigration: The Law of April 6, 1830, passed under Bustamante’s centralist regime, cut off legal U.S. immigration into Texas and imposed customs duties. This was a direct blow to colonies like DeWitt’s, which relied on a steady influx of settlers for growth. Families expecting to bring relatives or attract new neighbors suddenly found the door closed. Although the law exempted certain existing contracts, enforcement by military garrisons (like at Anahuac) was heavy-handed. Gonzales and surrounding settlements chafed under these limits, and some newcomers simply snuck into Texas illegally, undermining respect for Mexican law.
Economic and Cultural Frictions: The DeWitt colonists, mostly English-speaking Protestants, maintained their own schools, and conducted commerce largely with the United States (via ports like Lavaca or New Orleans). They “asked for their own judicial and educational systems” and used their own language, showing a preference for self-governance in daily life. Mexico’s attempts to integrate Texas—such as requiring Spanish language in official proceedings or enforcing customs checkpoints—were often resented or quietly ignored in Gonzales. As centralism rose, colonists feared an erosion of these informal freedoms.
Slavery: Many of DeWitt’s settlers, like other Anglo-Texans, had brought enslaved African-Americans to Texas or hoped to do so. While Mexico’s federal authorities had tolerated slavery in Texas initially (the state law converted enslaved persons into indentured servants-for-life as a loophole), the Mexican government’s 1829 general abolition of slavery and talk of enforcement alarmed slaveholders. Although Texas was given exemptions, the writing was on the wall that a centralist Mexico would eventually prohibit slavery. Settlers in Gonzales and nearby areas viewed this as a threat to their property and agricultural economy (many grew cotton). Growing Centralist influence thus directly challenged this crucial interest of Anglo colonists.
Militia Disarmament: Perhaps the most immediate trigger was Santa Anna’s policy of disarming local militias in 1835. The settlers of Gonzales had a small cannon (a bronze swivel cannon) originally given by the Mexican government for defense against natives. In September 1835, as unrest spread, Mexican commandant Col. Ugartechea ordered the removal of this cannon from Gonzales, likely fearing it could be used in an uprising. For the DeWitt colonists, relinquishing the cannon symbolized surrendering their right to local protection and autonomy. Gonzales’ alcalde, Andrew Ponton, stalled the Mexican detachment by refusing to hand over the cannon without proper written orders, and he secretly sent out riders to neighboring settlements for help. This act of defiance by local officials reflected how far sentiments in DeWitt’s Colony had shifted—formerly compliant citizens were now ready to resist the central government on principle.
By the fall of 1835, as Santa Anna’s centralist measures intensified, DeWitt’s colonists increasingly sided with the growing Texian resistance. Notably, many had not initially sought full independence; rather, they wanted a return to the federalist system and the liberties it guaranteed. Even after hostilities began, Texan leaders repeatedly declared they were fighting for the Constitution of 1824, not necessarily secession. A poignant primary source illustrating the colonists’ perspective is a January 4, 1836 address by James Kerr, a DeWitt Colony leader and member of the Texas provisional government. Kerr reminded Texans of their duty as “adopted citizens of Mexico” to uphold republican principles, and he condemned those urging complete independence prematurely. He argued that Texas had originally been a sovereign part of the Mexican federation and that Santa Anna’s illegal centralism had “transcended the powers delegated” by the people. Kerr emphasized that up to that point, Texans had fought under the Mexican tri-color flag, shouting “Liberty and the Constitution,” and planted it victorious on the walls of San Antonio in late 1835. This rhetoric shows that the older Anglo settlers like those of DeWitt’s Colony still framed their struggle as one to restore a violated social contract rather than to outright “rob Mexico of her lands”.
Ultimately, however, events pushed the colonists beyond reconciliation. DeWitt’s Colony became the cradle of armed revolt: the Battle of Gonzales on October 2, 1835 – the first skirmish of the Texas Revolution – was fought on their soil. When approximately 100 Mexican soldiers returned with orders to seize the Gonzales cannon, they found it fortified behind the Guadalupe River, guarded by hastily assembled Texian militiamen (including DeWitt colonists and volunteers from other towns). The Texans unfurled a makeshift white banner emblazoned with a black cannon and the defiant slogan “Come and Take It”. In a brief fight before dawn, the Texans repelled the Mexican force, which withdrew empty-handed. This minor victory electrified the colonists. Gonzales had openly defied Santa Anna’s centralist authority and shed blood for the cause—there was no turning back. One participant, John Henry Moore, reported that the Gonzales volunteers viewed the fight as defending their constitutional rights and community against unjust aggression, consistent with the strong states’ rights ethos they believed in.
Caption: The “Come and Take It” flag flown by Texians at Gonzales (1835), emblazoned with the disputed cannon. This flag, raised by settlers of DeWitt’s Colony, became a symbol of defiance against Mexican centralist authority.
In the aftermath, the once-moderate DeWitt colonists fully committed to the Texian war effort. Men from Gonzales formed the core of the “Gonzales Ranging Company”, a volunteer unit that later rushed to reinforce the Alamo (all 32 of those Gonzales men perished in the Alamo siege in March 1836, underscoring their dedication). The community also suffered during the war—Gonzales was burned in March 1836 as its residents fled the advancing Mexican army during the Runaway Scrape. Such sacrifices show how a population initially loyal to Mexico and wary of rebellion was radicalized by Santa Anna’s policies. DeWitt’s Colony settlers felt their way of life—local self-rule, property, and safety—was threatened by centralism, and they answered by taking up arms.
In summary, the people of DeWitt’s Colony initially hoped to thrive under Mexican federalism with minimal interference. They became increasingly alienated as centralist policies encroached on their autonomy and economic interests. By 1835–36, those settlers were not only reacting to events but actively shaping them, providing some of the first armed resistance to Santa Anna’s regime. Their journey from “moderate… sympathetic” citizens to revolutionaries mirrored the larger transformation of Anglo-Texan society in these years. It highlights how centralism vs. federalism was not an abstract debate on the frontier; it was felt in everyday issues of language, law, land, and liberty.
Tejano Perspectives: Mexican Texans and the Federalist Cause
While Anglo settlers often dominate narratives of Texas in 1836, the Tejanos—Texas-born Mexicans—were equally significant players in the struggle between federalism and centralism. Numbering only about 4,000–5,000 in the early 1830s (concentrated in long-established communities like San Antonio de Béxar, Goliad (La Bahía), and Victoria), Tejanos were a minority amid the growing Anglo population. Nonetheless, many Tejano leaders were ardent supporters of states’ rights and local self-governance. They too had embraced the Constitution of 1824 and resented Santa Anna’s centralist turn. However, Tejanos faced a complex predicament: they were loyal Mexicans by heritage and often by sentiment, yet they found themselves politically allied with Anglo-American colonists in opposing Santa Anna’s regime. This section explores Tejano views, highlighting key figures such as Juan Nepomuceno Seguín and others, to understand their motivations and contributions in 1836.
Juan Seguín, a young political leader from San Antonio, exemplified the Tejano commitment to federalism. Born in 1806 into an influential San Antonio family, Seguín had federalism in his blood—his father, Erasmo Seguín, had helped draft the 1824 Constitution and had served as a Texas representative in the Mexican Congress. Growing up during Mexico’s transition from Spanish rule, Juan Seguín came of age as the Mexican Republic was founded. He worked closely with the incoming Anglo settlers; his father had been Stephen F. Austin’s contact in San Antonio, and young Juan became fluent in English and familiar with American customs. Far from opposing the Anglo immigration, Seguín and many Tejanos welcomed it initially, seeing economic opportunity and a way to strengthen and develop Texas’s sparsely populated frontier. They expected, however, that the new settlers would live under Mexican law and that Texas would remain part of a free Mexico governed by the 1824 constitution.
Throughout the late 1820s and early 1830s, Seguín was a vocal federalist. He believed that the Constitution of 1824’s promise of strong state authority was essential for Texas’s development. Tejanos had long felt neglected by distant authorities—in Spanish times, Tejas was a remote province, and even under independent Mexico, the state government at Saltillo or Monclova often prioritized Coahuila’s issues over Texas’s. Federalism, to Seguín, meant that Texas could largely manage its own affairs (especially local economy and defense) while remaining within the Mexican union. In 1834, as Santa Anna’s intentions became suspect, Seguín became the political chief (jefe político) of the Department of Béxar (which encompassed San Antonio and surrounding areas). In this role, he had a front-row seat to the unfolding constitutional crisis. Seguín “saw firsthand the transition of the Mexican government from the federalist policies of the Constitution of 1824 to ‘centralism’” when Santa Anna began dismantling the federal system. He was alarmed by what he witnessed: the new centralist regime elevated the military and clergy (traditional power brokers) and curtailed local authority. The privileges and fueros (legal exemptions) of army officers and church officials were being restored, and the states’ voices were being silenced. Seguín understood that this meant trouble not only for Texas but for all liberal Mexican patriots.
Tejano leaders responded to these developments in several ways. In late 1834, anticipating Santa Anna’s next moves, Seguín issued a circular calling for a convention of Texas towns at San Antonio to discuss the crisis (an initiative similar to the Anglos’ Consultation). He was effectively rallying local leaders to form a united front in defense of federalism. Early in 1835, when Coahuila’s Governor Viesca and other federalists openly rebelled against Santa Anna, Seguín went so far as to raise a small force of Tejano militiamen (National Guardsmen) to support the cause. He coordinated with Anglo colleagues like Ben Milam in an attempt to aid the beleaguered federalist government of Coahuila at Monclova. Although that effort failed (Viesca was captured by centralist troops), Seguín came away convinced that Texas must act. In his memoirs, he recounts being “disgusted” by the collapse of resistance in Coahuila and resolved to “stir up Texas” against Santa Anna’s tyranny, as he felt no alternative remained.
When the first shots of rebellion were fired at Gonzales in October 1835, Seguín and many Tejanos cast their lot decisively with the Texian cause. Seguín raised a company of Tejano volunteers—he was commissioned as a Captain in the Federal Army of Texas—underscoring that he still viewed their fight as one to restore federalism (hence the use of the term “Federal Army”). He and his men participated in the Siege of Béxar (October–December 1835), where Texian and Tejano forces together ousted General Cos’s centralist garrison from San Antonio. During that campaign, Seguín’s local knowledge and Spanish language skills were invaluable; he negotiated the surrender of Mexican forces and helped ensure civility toward captured Mexican troops. After the victory, Seguín proudly reported that the tri-color Mexican flag of 1824 was raised by the victors—a potent symbol that the fight was for constitutional principles, not purely Texan separatism.
As 1836 unfolded, Tejanos remained deeply involved. José Antonio Navarro and José Francisco Ruiz, two prominent Tejano statesmen from San Antonio, served as delegates to the March 1836 Texas Convention at Washington-on-the-Brazos. Navarro, a personal friend of Stephen F. Austin and an advocate of Texan statehood, had initially hoped for reconciliation under a federal system but came to support independence when it was clear Santa Anna would not restore the constitution. Both Navarro and Ruiz signed the Texas Declaration of Independence, providing a crucial Mexican voice in that document and lending legitimacy to the claim that the revolution was not merely a foreign (Anglo) insurrection but a broad-based revolt of Texians (Anglo and Tejano alike). In the Declaration, the inclusion of grievances about the “consolidated, central, military despotism” and the unjust imprisonment of Texans (like Austin) would have resonated strongly with Tejano experiences as well. It is telling that the Declaration explicitly appealed to Mexican liberal sentiment by lamenting that appeals to the Mexican people for justice had been ignored or quashed by Santa Anna’s regime.
During the war, Tejano volunteers fought in several key battles. Seguín and his company were at the Battle of the Alamo (February–March 1836), serving as couriers and combatants. In fact, Seguín was dispatched from the Alamo as a courier to seek reinforcements and thus survived, going on to fight in the Battle of San Jacinto in April. At San Jacinto, Seguín commanded the Texian 2nd Cavalry Regiment, comprised mostly of Tejanos, which played a role in the final rout of Santa Anna’s army. Another Tejano, Plácido Benavides of Victoria (son-in-law of empresario Martín De León), had led resistance to centralist authority in the coastal region and helped recruit Tejano fighters, although he missed San Jacinto due to unrest in his home area. These men shared a conviction that Santa Anna’s centralism had to be resisted by force of arms.
It is important to note that not all Tejanos sided with the revolt. A number of Tejanos remained loyal to Mexico, especially among the older generation or those with strong ties to Mexican authorities. For example, Carlos de la Garza, a ranchero near Goliad, supported the Mexican army and helped Santa Anna’s cause as a scout. Some Tejano civilians simply wanted to avoid the conflict altogether, as it brought devastation to their homes (the war led to severe disruption and, in some cases, revenge attacks on Tejanos by both sides). But the core of Tejano leadership clearly identified with the federalist, and ultimately the independence, cause. This was rooted not in ethnic solidarity with Anglos but in political principle and practical concern for their community. As Seguín later wrote, “[We] remained federalists, advocating strong state governments and greater local control, and so we openly opposed Santa Anna and the centralists”.
Tejanos also brought a unique perspective: they could articulate the rebellion’s aims in terms of Mexican political ideals. When the Texan rebels in late 1835 still claimed to fight for the 1824 Constitution, it was figures like Seguín and Navarro who gave that claim credibility, since they had been part of Mexican politics and society. Seguín kept correspondence with federalist allies across the Rio Grande, attempting to coordinate a larger liberal revolt. Indeed, he and others hoped that a successful stand in Texas might inspire liberal forces in Mexico to topple Santa Anna, a point James Kerr also noted when he told Texans that “you appealed to the liberals of Mexico” during your struggle. This pan-Mexican liberal alliance did not materialize in time to help Texas (though Santa Anna’s regime was challenged in other regions concurrently). Nonetheless, the Tejano contribution ensured that the Texas Revolution, at least in 1835–36, was not framed purely as a Texan vs. Mexican ethnic conflict but as a civil war within Mexico over governance.
In conclusion, Tejanos in 1836 were motivated by a mix of loyalty to constitutional ideals, concern for their own local power and property, and indignation at Santa Anna’s authoritarian methods. They navigated a difficult path: rebelling against the government of their birth while aligning with Anglo newcomers who sometimes disdained Mexican culture. The trust and cooperation between men like Juan Seguín and Anglo leaders (e.g., Sam Houston, who recognized Seguín’s leadership by the commission at San Jacinto) were a critical factor in the success of the revolution. The Tejanos fought for a vision of Texas where their rights would be respected and where Texas could be self-governing, whether within a reformed Mexican republic or, as it turned out, as an independent nation. Their perspective underscores that the conflict of 1836 was fundamentally about political principles – federalism vs. centralism – transcending ethnicity.
New U.S. Arrivals: Illegal Immigration and the Drive for Self-Governance
Another crucial group shaping Texas’s trajectory in the 1830s were the newer Anglo-American arrivals—including many who came illegally after 1830, when Mexico tried to curtail American immigration. By 1836, these latecomers constituted a significant portion of the Anglo populace in Texas (which overall numbered around 30,000 settlers of U.S. origin). They brought with them distinct attitudes: a strong attachment to American ideals of individual rights and self-rule, and frequently a disregard for Mexican laws and authority. Their presence added volatility to the centralism vs. federalism conflict, as they were often more impatient for local control or even independence than the older colonists had been.
Demographically, the influx of the 1830s changed the balance in Texas. By the mid-1830s, Anglo-Americans outnumbered Tejanos roughly ten to one in Texas. This wave included adventurers, land speculators, farmers drawn by reports of fertile land, and some political radicals. Many slipped across the border in violation of Mexican law, especially after the 1830 ban. Mexican authorities lacked the resources to effectively police the vast frontier, so thousands of immigrants arrived without official permission. These settlers had never formally agreed to Mexico’s colonization terms (such as conversion to Catholicism or loyalty oaths) and often had minimal ties to Mexican institutions.
The cultural gap was stark. These newcomers “rarely abided by their contractual obligations” to the Mexican government. Few bothered to learn Spanish or integrate into Mexican society; English remained the dominant language in Anglo settlements, and U.S. customs and laws were informally practiced. Many continued to practice Protestant faiths despite Catholicism being the official religion. As one account puts it, “They seldom spoke the Spanish language, only occasionally practiced the official Catholic religion, and [even] changed the similar sounding ‘Tejas’ to an ‘x,’ creating ‘Texas’ when discussing the province”. This symbolically illustrated how they reshaped the identity of the region to fit their own. Moreover, they insisted on what they saw as their “inalienable rights” – concepts like trial by jury, the right to bear arms, freedom of assembly, and local representation, all hallmarks of Anglo-American political culture. Under Mexican law, some of these rights were not guaranteed (for instance, Mexican justice followed civil law traditions without jury trials, and freedom of religion was constrained). The new immigrants’ quickness to “defend” their rights led to confrontations with Mexican officials, who perceived them as unruly and disrespectful of Mexican sovereignty.
One flashpoint reflecting these tensions was the Anahuac Disturbances of 1832 and 1835 on the Texas coast. In these incidents, Mexican commanders (like Col. Juan Davis Bradburn in 1832 and Capt. Antonio Tenorio in 1835) attempted to enforce customs regulations and the law of April 1830, including the prohibition on further U.S. settlers. Recent American arrivals bristled at these restrictions. In 1832, settlers, many of whom had come post-1830, rose up, arresting the Mexican commander at Anahuac and briefly engaging Mexican troops. While in 1832 they politically aligned themselves with Santa Anna’s federalist revolt (as noted earlier), the underlying cause was their refusal to accept Mexican authority perceived as unjust. By 1835, similar sentiments led to another clash at Anahuac, as locals forced the surrender of the Mexican garrison. These episodes demonstrated that the newer settlers were willing to take extralegal action to assert what they saw as their rights.
Disdain for Mexican governance often went hand in hand with a view that Texas would ultimately be governed by Anglo-Americans under their own institutions. Some new arrivals openly spoke of eventual independence or annexation to the United States even before 1835. This was alarming to Mexican officials, reinforcing their belief that Americanization of Texas threatened Mexico’s territorial integrity. Indeed, Mexican centralist leaders like Lucas Alamán had warned that allowing too many Americans into Texas could lead to its loss – a prophecy that hardened their resolve to clamp down. The settlers’ non-compliance with Mexican laws (for example, continuing to bring slaves despite Mexico’s stance against slavery) was seen as evidence that **they “were quick to defend” their American way of life, even under Mexican rule.
Slavery was a particularly salient example. Many of the late-arriving Anglo families were from the American South and brought enslaved people or desired to use slave labor for cotton farming. After 1830, since new slave importation was technically illegal, they often circumvented rules by reclassifying slaves as indentured servants or by simply ignoring the laws in remote areas. Mexican authorities in Texas (like Colonel Juan Almonte, who did an inspection tour in 1834) reported widespread violation of the anti-slavery statutes and the immigration ban. Each illegal entrant and each illegal slave added to the Mexican government’s perception that Texans had “acquiesced in none” of the Mexican legal requirements and were moving on a separatist trajectory. The newcomers felt they were in the right, morally and practically. One can sense that by 1835, a critical mass of settlers in Texas had concluded that Mexican rule—especially Santa Anna’s centralized rule—was incompatible with the liberties they expected to enjoy.
The clumsy enforcement attempts by the centralist regime further inflamed the situation. In 1835, as Santa Anna’s new policies took effect, Mexican commanders were instructed to strictly enforce customs laws and the disarmament of local militias. Newly arrived Anglos, who had scant loyalty to Mexico to begin with, interpreted this as tyranny. For instance, when the Mexican military tried to retrieve the cannon from Gonzales (an episode already discussed), even those Anglo settlers who might have earlier kept a low profile rallied to resist. The rhetoric employed by Anglo-Americans at public meetings in 1835–36 often invoked the American Revolution’s ideals; they drew analogies between Santa Anna and Britain’s King George III, framing their struggle as one of free men resisting a distant despot. The latecomers were particularly drawn to this analogy, having grown up on stories of 1776. Thus, “the principles of your patriot fathers of 1776” were cited in Texan proclamations as guiding their actions. This ideological lens made compromise with Mexican authorities less likely, as many newer settlers had little interest in remaining under Mexican sovereignty except on their own terms.
By the time of the Texas Revolution, the attitudes of these newer U.S. arrivals had a pronounced effect on the push for full independence. In late 1835, as the Consultation created a provisional Texan government, there was a notable split: moderates (often older settlers like Austin) still hoped for reconciliation if Mexico’s federal constitution were restored, whereas a more radical wing (many of the newcomers among them) agitated for immediate independence from Mexico. This split led to “infighting” within the Texan provisional government. By early 1836, however, Santa Anna’s onslaught unified most of these factions. The radicals’ position for independence prevailed at the Convention of 1836, influenced in part by the intransigence of Santa Anna and the belief that even if he were defeated, remaining with Mexico would be untenable. New arrival delegates like George C. Childress (a Tennessee native who had been in Texas only a few months) were eager to sever ties; indeed, Childress is credited as the primary author of the Texas Declaration of Independence. The readiness of such men to declare independence was a culmination of their long-held disregard for Mexican authority and their commitment to American-style self-governance. In the Declaration itself, their viewpoint is evident: it complains that Mexican rule had become “an instrument… for [the Texans’] oppression,” that all appeals for constitutional government were met with force, and it asserts the natural right of people to change their government. These are essentially Jeffersonian arguments transplanted to Texas.
In sum, the influx of American immigrants in the early 1830s injected into Texas a population that was even less willing to compromise with centralist Mexico than the original settlers had been. Their disregard for Mexican authority wasn’t merely lawlessness; it was underpinned by a genuine belief that they were entitled to govern themselves according to the liberal republican principles they knew. Santa Anna’s centralism was anathema to them, and they had no allegiance to the Mexican nation to hold them back from rebellion. If the older settlers like those of DeWitt’s Colony needed a push to take up arms, many of the newer settlers needed only an opportunity. Together, both groups’ actions coalesced in 1836, but it’s clear that without the demographic and ideological shift brought by the newcomers, Texas’s break from Mexico might not have come as swiftly as it did.
From Tensions to War: The Road to 1836
By 1835, the cumulative strains—political, military, and cultural—had reached a breaking point. The long-brewing contest between federalism and centralism, compounded by the particular conditions in Texas, led to a chain of events that erupted into war in late 1835 and early 1836. This section chronicles key events that led to the Texas Revolution, highlighting especially the Battle of Gonzales (the “Lexington” of Texas) and the Texas Declaration of Independence, which together marked Texas’s point of no return from conflict. Alongside these, we consider other pivotal moments—conventions, skirmishes, and policy changes—that set the stage for independence.
Rising Tensions and Early Clashes (1835)
Throughout 1835, Texas was in a state of simmering unrest as Santa Anna’s centralist policies took effect. Communication between Texas towns and Mexican officials grew strained; rumors of Santa Anna’s intentions (such as plans to send a large army or emancipate slaves) spread fear. In June 1835, Texan settlers intercepted a letter by a Mexican officer that called some colonists “demagogues” and hinted at forcible disarmament, further inflaming opinion. Local Committees of Correspondence and Safety began coordinating resistance.
In September 1835, open conflict was precipitated by the Gonzales incident detailed earlier. Mexican commander in Texas, Col. Domingo de Ugartechea, stationed in San Antonio, ordered a small detachment of roughly 6–7 soldiers to travel to Gonzales and retrieve the town’s cannon. Tensions were already high, as days before a scuffle had broken out when a Mexican soldier assaulted a Gonzales resident, causing outrage. The demand for the cannon became a lightning rod. Gonzales’s refusal to surrender the armament, and the quick organization of Texian militiamen, turned this into an armed standoff. On October 2, 1835, the Texian volunteers (about 150 strong by then) engaged the Mexican troop at Gonzales. The skirmish was brief and casualties were minimal (one Mexican soldier killed, and at most one Texian wounded), but its significance was enormous. With the “Come and Take It” flag flying and the Mexican troops repelled, Texans had fired the first shot of the revolution rather than yield to centralist orders. News of the victory spread rapidly, emboldening resistance elsewhere.
Following Gonzales, larger clashes ensued. In mid-October 1835, Texian militia companies moved to capture the Mexican garrison at Presidio La Bahía in Goliad, which they accomplished on October 10. Around the same time, the long-planned Consultation of Texas delegates convened on October 15 (though it was later adjourned to November 1835 due to the unstable military situation). Delegates debated war aims—whether to declare independence immediately or to claim loyalty to Mexico under the 1824 Constitution. The eventual outcome was a compromise: the Consultation declared Texas’s support for the Mexican federal constitution and justified armed resistance as defense of their rights, stopping short of independence. They formed a provisional government with Henry Smith as Governor and Sam Houston as commander of a new Texian Army. However, as noted earlier, this provisional government was wracked by internal disagreements. Despite this, military campaigns continued.
The most significant campaign in late 1835 was the Siege of Béxar (San Antonio). After Gonzales, Texian forces under Stephen F. Austin (and later under Gen. Edward Burleson) advanced on San Antonio, where General Martín Perfecto de Cos (Santa Anna’s brother-in-law) had about 650 troops holed up, primarily in the fortified Alamo mission. From late October to early December, Texians besieged the town. Not all Texians agreed on the attack—some saw it as risky—but a core of volunteers, including many Tejanos under Juan Seguín, persisted. On December 5–9, 1835, in fierce house-to-house fighting, the Texian forces stormed San Antonio. Cos capitulated on December 9, agreeing to withdraw all Mexican troops from Texas. The Texian capture of San Antonio was a major victory: by the end of 1835, no Mexican garrisons remained in Texas. Texians and Tejanos jubilantly celebrated, believing the war might be over and that Mexico might now negotiate, perhaps even reinstating the 1824 Constitution. Indeed, the triumph was framed in federalist terms – the old Mexican tri-color flag was raised by the victors and toasts made to the constitution.
However, Santa Anna’s response would soon dash any hopes of a quick or negotiated end.
Santa Anna’s Offensive and the Declaration of Independence (Early 1836)
Upon learning of Cos’s defeat and the loss of Texas garrisons, President Santa Anna was furious and resolute. He regarded Texas’s actions unequivocally as a rebellious revolt. Late in 1835, Santa Anna publicly declared Texas in a state of rebellion (insurrection) and vowed to personally lead an army north to reconquer the region. He swiftly mustered a large force, known as the Army of Operations in Texas, composed of roughly 6,000 soldiers drawn from various parts of Mexico (many of whom were raw recruits). Santa Anna’s aim was twofold: to punish the insurgents and to reassert Mexican control up to the Sabine River, thus sending a message that Mexico would not tolerate secessionist movements.
In February 1836, Santa Anna’s advance units crossed the Rio Grande. Despite harsh winter conditions, he drove his men hard, determined to catch the Texans off guard. The first target was San Antonio, the symbol of Texan victory. On February 23, 1836, Santa Anna’s vanguard unexpectedly arrived at San Antonio, beginning the infamous Siege of the Alamo. About 200 Texan defenders (including figures like William B. Travis, Jim Bowie, and Davy Crockett) garrisoned the Alamo. Santa Anna’s main force soon encircled them. As the siege commenced, Travis penned urgent pleas for reinforcements, addressing “the people of Texas and all Americans in the world,” but due to the scattered Texan forces and the swiftness of Santa Anna’s attack, only the small Gonzales relief company managed to break through and join the Alamo’s defenders. The stand at the Alamo became a grim struggle, and on March 6, 1836, Santa Anna’s troops overwhelmed the fortress, killing the defenders to the last man. While the Alamo’s fall was a tactical Mexican victory, Santa Anna’s brutality there (and later at the Goliad Massacre on March 27, where over 300 Texan prisoners were executed) further inflamed Texan resolve and painted the conflict starkly as one between Mexican despotism and Texan freedom in the eyes of many.
During this tumultuous period, even as Santa Anna bore down on them, the Texians took a momentous political step: declaring independence from Mexico. The Convention of 1836 assembled at Washington-on-the-Brazos on March 1, 1836, with 59 delegates (representing both Anglo and Tejano communities). The delegates were well aware that Santa Anna’s forces were in Texas; indeed, as they met, the Alamo was under siege. Nonetheless, on March 2, 1836, they unanimously adopted the Texas Declaration of Independence. Drafted chiefly by George C. Childress, the declaration is a formal document that bears many similarities to the U.S. Declaration of 1776, but it is tailored to the Texas context. It lists a litany of grievances against the Mexican government and Santa Anna:
It decries that “the federal republican constitution of [Mexico]… no longer has a substantial existence, and the whole nature of [the] government has been forcibly changed… from a restricted federative republic… to a consolidated central, military despotism”, in which only the army and priesthood have a voice. This captures the essence of the centralism vs. federalism grievance.
It notes that “even the semblance of freedom is removed, and the forms… of the constitution discontinued,” referencing how Santa Anna abolished state institutions and ruled by decree.
It cites specific outrages: the arrest of Texan petitioners (alluding to Austin’s imprisonment), the stationing of standing armies among them, the denial of trial by jury, the violation of the right to bear arms, and the incitement of Native tribes and freed slaves against Texan settlers (the latter an accusation that Mexico was trying to foment slave rebellion).
It reminds that Mexico **“promised constitutional liberty” to the colonists but “in this expectation they have been cruelly disappointed”, since Santa Anna’s takeover.
The Declaration concludes that Texas is, and of right ought to be, a free, sovereign nation. It was a bold pronouncement—effectively treason against Mexico—and the delegates knew it. As they signed the document on March 2 and 3, they were informed of the dire situation at the Alamo, which only steeled their determination. They also hastily drafted a Constitution for the Republic of Texas and established an interim government, electing David G. Burnet as interim President and Sam Houston as General-in-Chief of the Texian army. Houston, who was at the convention as a delegate, left immediately after the declaration was adopted to take command of the scattered Texan fighters.
Caption: The Reading of the Texas Declaration of Independence (1936 painting by C. and F. Normann). In early March 1836, delegates at Washington-on-the-Brazos signed the Declaration, formally breaking away from Santa Anna’s centralist Mexico. This artistic depiction shows the diverse founders of the Republic of Texas gathered as the document is read aloud.
The declaration galvanized the Texian cause, giving it a clear objective: independence rather than reconciliation. Yet, the military situation was perilous. Throughout March 1836, Santa Anna’s armies ranged across Texas, and civilians fled their approach in the Runaway Scrape, a chaotic evacuation toward the U.S. border. The newly declared Republic of Texas was, in these weeks, a government on paper without secure territory. Sam Houston adopted a strategic retreat, avoiding pitched battle while he rebuilt the Texian army. Many criticized him for not immediately confronting Santa Anna, but Houston understood that a premature fight could be disastrous. By April, Houston’s forces swelled with volunteers (news of the massacres at the Alamo and Goliad had sparked outrage and additional recruits, even some from the United States crossing in to help).
The climactic encounter came on April 21, 1836, at the Battle of San Jacinto near the present-day city of Houston. In a surprise attack on Santa Anna’s encampment, Houston’s roughly 900 Texians routed the Mexican force of about 1,200. The battle lasted just 18 minutes of intense fighting; the cry “Remember the Alamo! Remember Goliad!” rang out as Texians charged. They achieved a complete victory, killing or capturing hundreds of Mexican soldiers. Santa Anna himself was captured the following day, found hiding in a marsh. This triumph effectively decided the war. A few weeks later, Santa Anna, as a prisoner, signed the Treaties of Velasco, agreeing to cease hostilities and withdraw Mexican troops south of the Rio Grande. Although the Mexican government back in Mexico City never formally ratified Texas independence, Texas had in fact won it on the battlefield.
San Jacinto’s victory was the fruit of the deep tensions we have traced: Texians fighting under the banner of liberty and local rights overcame a numerically superior force whose leader embodied centralized authoritarian rule. In the aftermath, Texas stood independent, and the conflict between federalism and centralism had carved out a new political entity. The war of 1836 can thus be seen not only as a fight for Texan independence but as one chapter in the larger Mexican civil strife over governance. In Texas, the federalist ideal (transmuted into Texan republicanism) prevailed. In Mexico, however, Santa Anna’s centralist government limped on for a while longer, discredited by the Texas debacle and challenged by ongoing revolts until it eventually fell in 1840 and the federal constitution was restored in 1846.
The year 1836 was a watershed moment shaped by the clash between centralism and federalism. The politics of Mexico—torn between concentrating power in the capital or diffusing it among the states—directly influenced the fate of Texas. Santa Anna’s pursuit of a unitary state collided with the values and interests of both Anglo-Texan colonists and many native Tejanos. The Texans’ victory and secession created the Republic of Texas, altering the map of North America and setting the stage for future conflicts (including the Mexican–American War a decade later).
In examining the Texas Revolution through the prism of centralist vs. federalist tensions, we see that it was far more than an isolated frontier rebellion. It was intertwined with Mexico’s national constitutional crisis. The origins of the conflict lay in divergent visions of governance post-independence: one vision upheld local liberties and state sovereignty, the other sought order and stability through central authority. Santa Anna’s personal journey from federalist champion to centralist caudillo epitomized this reversal and directly triggered Texas’s break. On the Texan side, the original settlers (like those of DeWitt’s Colony) who came under promises of federal liberty felt compelled to defend those principles when they were threatened. Tejano leaders added their voices, fighting not against Mexico per se, but against the violation of the liberal ideals they cherished as Mexicans. Meanwhile, new American immigrants brought revolutionary fervor and little patience for distant rule, thereby quickening the march toward independence.
Finally, the key events of 1835–1836—from the skirmish at Gonzales where resolute settlers dared a central army to “come and take” their rights, to the Declaration at Washington-on-the-Brazos where Texans formally repudiated Santa Anna’s “consolidated despotism”—can all be understood as milestones in the struggle between these two political philosophies. The outcome in Texas was the triumph (locally) of the federalist, self-governing ethos, albeit outside the Mexican Republic’s framework. Yet the legacy is complex: the centralist-federalist divide continued to plague Mexico internally, and Texas’s independence would eventually draw the United States into war with Mexico, reshaping the continent.
In the immediate context of 1836, however, one observation by James Kerr to his fellow Texans resonates powerfully: “Throughout the republic, the two parties are arrayed… and all liberalists coincide with you in the correctness of the principles you have avowed”. Texas’s revolt was, in the eyes of its participants, one theater in a wider battle for liberal, federal governance against authoritarian centralism. 1836 proved to be the decisive chapter for Texas’s own destiny in that struggle, giving birth to a new republic dedicated (at least in principle) to the freedoms for which the settlers had fought.
References (Primary and Scholarly Sources)
Primary Sources:
Texas Declaration of Independence (1836). Original declaration adopted March 2, 1836, Washington-on-the-Brazos. (See excerpt: Texas delegates list grievances against Santa Anna’s “military despotism” and proclaim Texas a free republic.)
James Kerr, “To the People of Texas” (January 4, 1836). Open letter by a member of Texas’s General Council. (Articulates the Texian view that Mexico’s centralist government broke the constitutional compact, justifying Texan armed resistance to uphold the Constitution of 1824.)
Juan N. Seguín, Memoir/Reminiscences (1858). Published in “A Revolution Remembered…Juan N. Seguín” (1991). (Seguín recalls how he and fellow Tejanos remained loyal to federalism, opposed Santa Anna’s centralism, and took up arms alongside Anglo-Texans after 1835.)
William Fairfax Gray, Diary (Convention of 1836 eyewitness). Entry of March 2, 1836. (Describes proceedings of the Texas Independence Convention and the rapid adoption of the Declaration of Independence.)
“Come and Take It” Flag, Battle of Gonzales (1835). Physical artifact and contemporary accounts. (The flag created by Gonzales settlers, referenced in battle reports, symbolized Texian defiance of disarmament demands.)
Reputable Scholarly Works and Secondary Sources:
Texas State Historical Association (TSHA), Handbook of Texas Online:
“DeWitt’s Colony.” (Provides history of the colony, noting its moderate stance prior to 1835 and involvement in early revolutionary events.)
“Texas Revolution.” (Overview of causes, key events from 1835–1836, including Santa Anna’s actions and Texas response, battles, etc.)
“The 1836 Project: Telling the Texas Story” (Texas Heritage Commission, 2021) – educational overview: (Details Mexico’s political split between Centralists and Federalists, Anglo settlers’ preference for the 1824 Constitution, cultural frictions such as language, legal systems, and slavery in Texas. Summarizes the 1830 immigration law, 1832 reopening, 1834 switch back to centralism, and states’ revolts.)
Alamo Trust, “Federalism vs. Centralism: Why it Mattered to the Texas Revolution” (The Alamo Messenger, 2016) by Bruce Winders: (Analyzes the ideological conflict’s direct impact on Texas. Explains how Santa Anna’s repeal of the 1824 Constitution shifted power to Mexico City, and how Coahuila’s centralists and Texas’s federalists diverged – setting the stage for revolution.)
Gilder Lehrman Institute, “Texas Declaration of Independence, 1836” (Spotlight on primary source with commentary): (Provides context for the declaration, noting it came after Mexico’s dissolution of state legislatures, disarmament of militias, and abolition of the 1824 Constitution.)
Stephen L. Hardin, Texian Iliad: A Military History of the Texas Revolution (1994). (A scholarly narrative of the war, detailing events like Gonzales, the Siege of Béxar, the Alamo, and San Jacinto, with analysis of how political motives and factional disputes influenced military decisions.)
Will Fowler, Santa Anna of Mexico (2007). (Biography of Santa Anna that explores his ideological shifts and their consequences. Illuminates Santa Anna’s political opportunism, his role in the centralist coup of 1834, and his strategy in the Texas campaign.)
Jesús F. de la Teja (ed.), Tejano Leadership in Mexican and Revolutionary Texas (2010). (Essays on Tejano figures such as Seguín and Navarro, offering insight into their federalist leanings, contributions to Texas independence, and the complex identity struggle they faced.)
Stanley F. Horn, The Army of Texas in the Texas Revolution (1939). (Covers the composition of Texian forces, including the influx of volunteers from the U.S., and attitudes of late-arriving settlers. Discusses discipline issues and ideological motivations within the revolutionary army.)
Centralist Republic of Mexico – Encyclopedia of Latin American History (Oxford University Press, 2018). (Provides a broader Mexican context for the 1830s, noting the conservative rationale for centralism, the multiple federalist revolts it provoked, and the eventual failure of the centralist experiment.)